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SII - WEAKENING LIQUIDITY FLOWS
Though we have weakening liquidity flows in the US (TAPER has ended) Friday's JAPANESE QQE ANNOUNCMENT Injects Trillions of YEN into the Global Carry Trade.
We now consider this Q3 MACRO Call COMPLETED
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11-01-14 |
LIQUIDITY |
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HALLOWEEN MASSACRE - Japan's Insane Monetary Announcement
Japan's BOJ Kuroda
Headlines:
- USDJPY rose 2.7% today - biggest day in 18 months back to Oct 2007; +3.7% on the week - bighest week since Dec 2009
- Nikkei +7.7% today - biggest day since March 2009; +10% on the week - biggest week since Dec 2009
- Russell 2000's up over 6% - best month in 15 months
- Russell +1.2% year-to-date
- Nasdaq at March 2000 highs
- 5Y yields up 12bps on the week - biggest increase in 6 months
- 2Y yields up 11bps on the week - biggest increase in over 3 years
- 5s30s flattened 10bps on the week - biggest flattening in 7 months
- Silver -6.1% on the week - worst week in 16 months
- Gold -4.7% on the week - worst week in 16 months
David Stockman via Contra Corner blog,
This is just plain sick. Hardly a day after the greatest central bank fraudster of all time, Maestro Greenspan, confessed that QE has not helped the main street economy and jobs, the lunatics at the BOJ flat-out jumped the monetary shark. Even then, the madman Kuroda pulled off his incendiary maneuver by a bare 5-4 vote. Apparently the dissenters - Messrs. Morimoto, Ishida, Sato and Kiuchi - are only semi-mad.
Never mind that the BOJ will now escalate its bond purchase rate to $750 billion per year - a figure so astonishingly large that it would amount to nearly $3 trillion per year if applied to a US scale GDP. And that comes on top of a central bank balance sheet which had previously exploded to nearly 50% of Japan’s national income or more than double the already mind-boggling US ratio of 25%.
In fact, this was just the beginning of a Ponzi scheme so vast that in a matter of seconds its ignited the Japanese stock averages by 5%. And here’s the reason: Japan Inc. is fixing to inject a massive bid into the stock market based on a monumental emission of central bank credit created out of thin air. So doing, it has generated the greatest front-running frenzy ever recorded.
The scheme is so insane that the surge of markets around the world in response to the BOJ’s announcement is proof positive that the mother of all central bank bubbles now envelopes the entire globe. Specifically, in order to go on a stock buying spree, Japan’s state pension fund (the GPIF) intends to dump massive amounts of Japanese government bonds (JCB’s). This will enable it to reduce its government bond holding - built up over decades - from about 60% to only 35% of its portfolio.
Needless to say, in an even quasi-honest capital market, the GPIF’s announced plan would unleash a relentless wave of selling and price decline. Yet, instead, the Japanese bond market soared on this dumping announcement because the JCBs are intended to tumble right into the maws of the BOJ’s endless bid. Charles Ponzi would have been truly envious!
Accordingly, the 10-year JGB is now trading at a microscopic 43 bps and the 5-year at a hardly recordable 11 bps. So, say again. The purpose of all this massive money printing is to drive the inflation rate to 2%. Nevertheless, Japanese government debt is heading deeper into the land of negative real returns because there are no rational buyers left in the market - just the BOJ and some robots trading for a few bps of spread on the carry.
Whether it attains its 2% inflation target or not, its is blindingly evident that the BOJ has destroyed every last vestige of honest price discovery in Japan’s vast bond market. Notwithstanding the massive hype of Abenomics, Japan’s real GDP is lower than it was in early 2013, while its trade accounts have continued to deteriorate and real wages have headed sharply south.
So there is no recovery whatsoever—-not even the faintest prospect that Japan can grow out if its massive debts. The latter now stands at a staggering 250% of GDP on the government account and upwards of 600% of GDP when the debts of business, households and the financial sectors are included. And on top of that there is Japan’s inexorable demographic bust—–a force which will shrink the labor force and squeeze even further its tepid growth of output as far as the eye can see.
Stated differently, Japan is an old age colony which is heading for bankruptcy. It has virtually no prospect for measurable economic growth and a virtual certainty that taxes will keep rising —since notwithstanding the much lamented but unavoidable consumption tax increase last spring it is still borrowing 40 cents on every dollar it spends.
So 5-year JGBs yielding just 11 bps are an insult to rationality everywhere, and a warning that Japan’s financial system is a disaster waiting to happen. But even that is not the end of it. Having slashed its historic holdings of JCBs, the GPIF will now double it allocation to equities, raising its investment in domestic and international stocks to 24% each.
Stated differently, 50% of GPIF’s $1.8 trillion portfolio will flow into world stock markets. On top of that—the BOJ will pile on too—-tripling its annual purchase of ETFs and other equity securities. This is surely madness, but the point of the whole enterprise explains why the world economy is in such extreme danger. A Japanese market watcher caught the essence of it in his observation about the madman who runs the bank of Japan,
“Kuroda loves a surprise — Kuroda doesn’t care about common sense, all he cares about is meeting the price target,” said Naomi Muguruma, a Tokyo-based economist at Mitsubishi UFJ Morgan Stanley Securities Co., who correctly forecast more stimulus today.
That’s right. Its 2% on the CPI…..come hell or high water. There is not a smidgeon of evidence that 2% inflation is any better for the real growth of enterprise, labor hours supplied and economic productivity than is 1% or 3%. Its pure Keynesian mythology. Yet all the world’s central banks are beating a path toward the same mindless 2% inflation target that lies behind this morning’s outbreak of monetary madness in Japan.
Folks, look-out below. As George W. Bush said in another context…..this sucker is going down! |
11-01-14 |
LIQUIDITY |
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Charting Banzainomics: What The BOJ's Shocking Announcement Really Means 10-31-14 Zero Hedge
Still confused what the BOJ's shocking move was about, aside from pushing the US stock market to a new record high of course? This should explains it all: as the chart below show, as a result of the BOJ's stated intention to buy 8 trillion to 12 trillion yen ($108 billion) of Japanese government bonds per month it means the BOJ will now soak up all of the 10 trillion yen in new bonds that the Ministry of Finance sells in the market each month.
In other words. The Bank of Japan’s expansion of record stimulus today may see it buy every new bond the government issues.
This is what full monetization looks like.
More from Bloomberg:
The central bank is already the largest single holder of Japan’s bonds, and the scale of its buying could fuel concerns it is underwriting deficits of a nation with the heaviest debt burden. The BOJ could end up owning half of the JGB market by as early as in 2018, according to Takuji Okubo, chief economist at Japan Macro Advisors in Tokyo.
“Kuroda knows when to go ALL in,” Okubo wrote in a note. “The BOJ is basically declaring that Japan will need to fix its long-term problems by 2018, or risk becoming a failed nation.”
The unprecedented efforts to stoke inflation could scare bond investors, said Chotaro Morita, the chief rates strategist in Tokyo at SMBC Nikko Securities Inc.
Kuroda said earlier this month that while the BOJ holds only about 20 percent of Japan’s outstanding government bonds, the Bank of England holds approximately 40 percent of U.K. government debt.
We wish Japan the best of luck in avoiding becoming a "failed nation."
Then again there is something to be said about a nation which is now desperately, and obviously to everyone, tryingto unleash hyperinflation... and, for now at least, is failing.
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11-01-14 |
LIQUIDITY |
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Japan risks Asian currency war with fresh QE blitz 10-31-14 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Telegraph
The Bank of Japan is mopping up the country's vast debt and driving down the yen in a radical experiment in modern global finance
The Bank of Japan has stunned the world with fresh blitz of stimulus, pushing quantitative easing to unprecedented levels in a bid to drive down the yen and avert a relapse into deflation.
The move set off a euphoric rally on global equity markets but the economic consequences may be less benign. Critics say it threatens a trade shock across Asia in what amounts to currency warfare, risking serious tensions with China and Korea, and tightening the deflationary noose on Europe.
The Bank of Japan (BoJ) voted by 5:4 in a hotly-contested decision to boost its asset purchases by a quarter to roughly $700bn a year, covering the fiscal deficit and the lion’s share of Japan’s annual budget. “They are monetizing the national debt even if they don’t want to admit it,” said Marc Ostwald, from Monument Securities.
In a telling move, the bank will concentrate fresh firepower on Japanese government bonds (JGBs), pushing the average maturity out to seven to 10 years. It also pledged to triple the amount that will be injected directly into the Tokyo stock market through exchange-traded funds, triggering a 4.3pc surge in the Topix index.
Governor Haruhiko Kuroda said the fresh stimulus was intended to “pre-empt” mounting deflation risks in the world, and vowed to do what ever it takes to lift inflation to 2pc and see through Japan’s "Abenomics" revolution. “We are at a critical moment in our efforts to break free from the deflationary mindset,” he said.
The unstated purpose of Mr Kuroda’s reflation drive is to lift nominal GDP growth to 5pc a year. The finance ministry deems this the minimum level needed to stop a public debt of 245pc of GDP from spinning out of control. The intention is to erode the debt burden through a mix of higher growth and negative real interest rates, a de facto tax on savings.
Mr Kuroda’s own credibility is at stake since he said in July that there was “no chance” of core inflation falling below 1pc. It now threatens to do exactly that as the economy struggles to overcome a sharp rise in the sales tax from 5pc to 8pc in April.
Marcel Thieliant, from Capital Economics, said the BoJ already owns a quarter of all Japanese state bonds, and a third of short-term notes. Its balance sheet will henceforth rise by 1.4pc of GDP each month, three times the previous pace of QE by the US Federal Reserve.
There is little chance that the BoJ will meet its 2pc inflation target by early next year, showing just how difficult it is to generate lasting price rises once deflation has become lodged in an economy. Household spending fell 5.6pc in September, though there are tentative signs of an industrial rebound.
The latest move - already dubbed QE9 – sent the yen plummeting 2.6pc to ¥112 against the dollar, the weakest in seven years. The currency has fallen 40pc against the dollar, euro and Korean won since mid-2012, and 50pc against the Chinese yuan. This is a dramatic shift for a country that remains a global industrial powerhouse, with machinery and car producers that compete toe-to-toe with German and Korean rivals in global markets. “They are going to be screaming across Asia if the yen gets near ¥120 to the dollar,” said Mr Ostwald.
Panasonic said it plans to “reshore” plant from China back to Japan. There are increasing signs that Japanese companies are rethinking the whole logic of hollowing out operations at home to build factories abroad.
Hans Redeker, from Morgan Stanley, said Japan is exporting its deflationary pressures to the rest of Asia. “It is not clear whether other countries can cope with this. There have been a lot of profit warnings in Korea. The entire region is already in difficulties with overcapacity and a serious debt overhang. Dollar-denominated debt has risen exponentially to $2.5 trillion from $300bn in 2005, and credit efficiency is declining,” he said.
Albert Edwards, from Societe Generale, said Japan is at the epicentre of a currency maelstrom, a replay of the Asian financial crisis from 1997-1998, though this time the region is a much bigger part of the global economy. “China cannot tolerate this kind of shock when it already faces a credit crunch and has suffered a massive loss in competitiveness. Foreign direct investment into China has already turned negative,” he said.
It was a yen slide in 1998 that led to the most dangerous episode of the Asian drama. China threatened to retaliate, a move that would have threatened the disintegration of the regional trading system. It took direct action by Washington and concerted global intervention to stabilise the yen and contain the crisis.
This yen-yuan dynamic is looming again. China has for now stopped buying foreign bonds to weaken its currency but this has let deflationary forces gain a footing in the Chinese economy. “If China’s inflation rate falls below 1pc, it will be forced to devalue as well. Currency war was always how this was going to end, and it risks sending a wave of deflation across the world from Asia,” he said.
As each country resorts to a beggar-thy-neighbour policy in moves akin to the 1930s, deflation is dumped in the lap of any region that is slow to respond - currently the eurozone.
Stephen Lewis, from Monument, said the BoJ’s new stimulus is a disguised way to soak up some $250bn of government bonds that will be coming onto the market as Japan’s $1.2 trillion state pension fund (GPIF) slashes its weighting for domestic bonds to 35pc. This avoids a spike in yields, the nightmare scenario for Japanese officials.
The GPIF will have buy $90bn of Japanese equities and $110bn of foreign stocks to lift its weighting to 25pc for each category. This will be a shot in the arm for global bourses, but also a clever way for Japan to intervene in the currency markets to hold down the yen.
The BoJ has in effect outsourced its devaluation policy, shielding it against accusations of currency manipulation. Any retaliation by China is likely to be conducted by the same arms-length mechanism.
Japan has to move carefully. The world turned a blind eye to the currency effects of Mr Kuroda’s first round of QE because the yen was then seriously overvalued. This is no longer the case.
The risk for premier Shinzo Abe is that further bursts of stimulus may be taken by critics as an admission of failure, though it is in reality far too early to judge whether the country has closed the chapter on its two Lost Decades. What seems certain is that Japan was sliding headlong into a debt compound trap before Mr Abe launched his “Hail Mary” pass into the unknown.
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11-01-14 |
LIQUIDITY |
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| MOST CRITICAL TIPPING POINT ARTICLES THIS WEEK - Oct. 26th, 2014 - Nov. 1st, 2014 |
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| TO TOP |
| MACRO News Items of Importance - This Week |
US ECONOMIC REPORTS & ANALYSIS |
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LEADING INDICATORS - Ratio of Coincident-to-Lagging Conference Board Indices
SOURCE
As Evergreen Gavekal notes, the ratio of coincident-to-lagging conference board indices has an admirable record as a recession forecaster... and is at its lowest level since Sept 2009. h/t @EvergreenGK
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10-29-14 |
INDICATORS
GROWTH |
US ECONOMIC |
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| TECHNICALS & MARKET ANALYTICS |
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PATTERNS - Looming Near Term Overhead Resistance
SPY
CLICK TO ENLARGE
RUSSELL 2000
CLICK TO ENLARGE |
10-30-14 |
PATTERNS |
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GOLD - Tracks US Debt Growth, Until Recently?
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10-29-14 |
STUDY
GOLD |
ANALYTICS |
SPECIAL 9 PAGE GOLD & SILVER REPORT
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LEADING INDICATORS - US Housing
SOURCE
There has never been a time when the all important leading indicator that is the San Fran housing market (see here for the reasons why) has posted such a steep slowdown in annual price increases without a bubble of some sort, be it the dot com, the first housing or the European sovereign debt bubble, having burst.
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10-29-14 |
PATTERNS
CATALYSTS
HOUSING |
ANALYTICS |
BREADTH - "Volumeless" and "Overbought"
Mentality that fosters complacency and excess in the first place, remains in effect
SOURCE
As Bloomberg reports, Worth adds that uptrends have been broken worldwide and rebounding stocks are back to "difficult" levels where sellers may re-exert control.
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10-29-14 |
PATTERNS
BREADTH |
ANALYTICS |
PATTERNS - Short Squeeze
SOURCE
SOURCE
nd the Relative Strength Indicator is once again signaling a trend change...
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10-29-14 |
PATTERNS
RUSSELL |
ANALYTICS |
PATTERNS - McClelland Oscillator Warning
SOURCE
McClellan Oscillator at a notable extreme...
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10-29-14 |
PATTERNS |
ANALYTICS |
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2012 - FINANCIAL REPRESSION |
2012
2013
2014 |
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FINANCIAL REPRESSION -
American-Made Financial Repression 10-24-14 Project Syndicate
HONG KONG – A generation of development economists owe Ronald McKinnon, who died earlier this month, a huge intellectual debt for his insight – introduced in his 1973 book Money and Capital in Economic Development – that governments that engage in financial repression (channeling funds toward themselves to reduce their debt) hamper financial development. Indeed, McKinnon provided the key to understanding why emerging economies’ financial sectors were underdeveloped.
At the end of his life, McKinnon was working on a related – also potentially groundbreaking – concept: a dollar-renminbi standard. In his view, such a system would alleviate the financial repression and fragmentation that is undermining global financial stability and growth. The question is whether the powers that be – particularly in the United States, which has long benefited from the dollar’s global domination – would ever agree to such a cooperative system.
The notion that the dollar’s global dominance is contributing to financial repression represents a significant historical shift. As McKinnon pointed out, the dollar became a dominant international currency after World War II because it helped to reduce financial repression and fragmentation in Europe and Asia, where
- High inflation,
- Negative real interest rates, and
- Excessive regulation prevailed.
By using the dollar to anchor prices and the Federal Reserve’s interest rate as the benchmark for the cost of capital, invoicing, payments, clearing, liquidity, and central-bank reserves all became more stable and reliable.
As long as the US remained competitive and productive, currencies that were pegged to the dollar benefited considerably. For economies in transition – such as Western Europe in the 1950s-1960s, Asia during the growth miracle of the 1970s-1990s, and China in 1996-2005 – the dollar provided an anchor for the macroeconomic stabilization efforts and fiscal and monetary discipline that structural transformation demanded.
But two disruptions undermined these benefits.
- First, in 1971, the US terminated the dollar’s convertibility to gold, opening the way for the emergence of a new exchange-rate regime, based on freely floating fiat currencies.
- Then came the period of “Japan-bashing” in the 1980s-1990s, which culminated in threats from the US to impose trade sanctions if Japan’s competitive pressure on American industries did not ease. With the subsequent sharp appreciation in the yen/dollar exchange rate, from ¥360:$1 to ¥80:1, the world’s second-largest economy has suffered through two decades of deflation and stagnation.
Throughout this period, McKinnon argued that, by forcing America’s trade partners to bear the burden of adjustment, the dollar’s predominance leads to “conflicted virtue”: surplus countries like Japan, Germany, and China faced pressure to strengthen their currencies, at the risk of triggering deflation. If they failed to do so, their “undervalued” exchange rates were criticized as unfair.
But McKinnon disagreed with the conventional wisdom that the best way to resolve this conflict would be to shift to flexible exchange rates. Instead, he recommended that Asian countries develop a regional currency that would provide macroeconomic stability in the face of dollar volatility. Long before the Bretton Wood institutions conceded that capital controls could be useful, McKinnon was asserting that, under certain circumstances, such controls might be necessary to supplement prudential banking regulation.
McKinnon has a particularly strong following among Chinese economists. China achieved its strongest growth when the renminbi was pegged to the dollar – a system that required steadfast reforms and strict fiscal discipline.
The renminbi’s steady appreciation against the dollar – at an annual rate of about 3%, on average, since 2005 – shrank China’s current-account surplus. In a weak global economic environment, China’s progress in addressing macroeconomic imbalances, while maintaining an annual growth rate of about 7%, was no small feat.
But the renminbi’s appreciation also attracted carry-trade speculators, who purchased renminbi assets in order to benefit from high interest rates (particularly after 2008) and exchange-rate gains. This is partly why China’s foreign-exchange reserves have swelled so rapidly, from $250 billion in 2000 to $4 trillion this year.
The problem, as McKinnon recognized, is that these speculative inflows of “hot” money have weakened China’s macroeconomic tools and fueled ever more financial repression. For starters, China’s leaders, recognizing that higher interest rates would draw even greater inflows, are increasingly wary of interest-rate – and even capital-account – liberalization.
Making matters worse, the Chinese authorities are tightening credit and regulating the money supply through sterilization and high reserve requirements for bank deposits – an approach that undermines real economic growth considerably. In order to stem this decline without raising interest rates too much, they have resorted to administratively targeted credit loosening.
More “China-bashing,” with the US demanding that the renminbi be allowed to appreciate further, is clearly not the answer. Instead, the US should focus on reducing its own fiscal deficit, thereby facilitating Chinese efforts to boost domestic consumption. If the Fed’s benchmark interest rate can be restored to historical trend levels, China would have more policy space to adjust interest rates in alignment with its growth pattern and pursue an orderly opening of its capital account.
Simply put, the world needs its two largest economies to work together to bolster global monetary stability. Together, China and the US can alleviate financial repression, avert protectionist tendencies, and help maintain a strong foundation for global stability. Unfortunately, McKinnon’s policy advice has not been popular among mainstream American economists and policymakers, who prefer the short-term political advantages afforded to them by free-market rhetoric.
It is time for US leaders to recognize that what former French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing called the “exorbitant privilege” that the dollar’s global dominance affords America also entails considerable responsibility. Global monetary stability is, after all, a public good.
Read more from Honoring Ronald McKinnon
Ronald McKinnon, a former professor at Stanford University and a renowned specialist on monetary policy and international trade and finance, passed away earlier this month. In his honor, Project Syndicate has compiled a list of commentaries that explore the impact of his work.
Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-dollar-dominance-burdens-china-by-andrew-sheng-and-geng-xiao-2014-10#BPTvVg1Yqk9iDk8V.99
Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-dollar-dominance-burdens-china-by-andrew-sheng-and-geng-xiao-2014-10#BPTvVg1Yqk9iDk8V.99
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10-27-14 |
THESIS |
FINANCIAL REPRESSION
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FLOWS - Liquidity, Credit & Debt
The Chart That Explains Why Fed's Bullard Wants To Restart The QE Flow 10-19-14 Zero Hedge
Remember when the Fed (and their Liesman-esque lackies) tried to convince the world that it was all about the 'stock' - and not the 'flow' - of Federal Reserve Assets that kept the world afloat on easy monetary policy (despite even Bullard admitting that was not the case after Goldman exposed the ugly truth). Having first explained to the world that it's all about the flow over 2 years ago, it appears that, as every equity asset manager knows deep down (but is loathed to admit for fear of losing AUM), of course "tapering is tightening" - as the following chart shows, equity markets are waking up abruptly to that reality. So no wonder Bullard is now calling for moar QE - he knows it's all there is to fill the gap between economic reality and market fiction.
Tapering is Tightening.... as the flow of Fed free money slows... so equity performance suffers.
Of course it's not just the Fed (as Citi shows below) but for now the ECB seems unable to pull the trigger and the BoJ is hitting both political and market sentiment limits on its craziness.
And we better get moar... because the gap between perception and reality is huge...
Charts: Bloomberg and @Not_Jim_Cramer
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10-31-14 |
FLOWS |
FLOWS
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FLOWS - Liquidity, Credit & Debt
RICHARD DUNCAN
PLAY VIDEO
People often ask me, “How severe would the New Depression be?” And I think the best way to think about it is to consider what happened with the last Depression. After all, the two occurred for the same reason; a fiat money credit bubble formed when we broke the link between dollars and gold both times.
So what happened in the 1930s? Well international trade collapsed and the international banking system collapsed; 1/3 of all the U.S. banks failed and international…so people lost all of the savings they thought they had. Without very aggressive government intervention to save the banks, in other words, if we allow a laissez faire solution, then all the saving in the world would be destroyed and trade barriers would go up as they did in the 1930s, so global trade would collapse.
And what would that mean, for instance, for a country like China? China’s economy is entirely dependent on exporting to the United States. If the United States stops taking China’s imports into the United States, China’s economy would not have a recession, it would implode. There would be starvation in the cities and in the countryside. Regardless of what the Chinese government wanted, the starving Chinese would float down the Mekong River and invade Southeast Asia and eat all the rice in Thailand…and how would the government respond to that?
With the complete collapse of government revenues, the United States could no longer afford to maintain a string of military bases around the world, so our global economic dominance would evaporate. We also couldn’t afford to continue paying Social Security or Medicare and so, once again the old people in this country would be on the verge of starvation (if not starving) as they were in the 1930s. It would be more or less a collapse of civilization as we know it.
Unemployment would be at least 25 percent in this country, I would imagine, and how would those people vote? They would vote for parties that promised to give them money and food. In other words, we would take a very, very hard turn to the left and that may be met with the response from the right that involved a military coup.
So it’s not at all certain that democracy could survive this sort of New Depression, and that’s why our government is so keen to make sure that that doesn’t happen. That’s why they’re going to continue supporting the economy with very large budget deficits when necessary and finance those deficits with quantitative easing when necessary.
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10-31-14 |
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Gordon T Long is not a registered advisor and does not give investment advice. His comments are an expression of opinion only and should not be construed in any manner whatsoever as recommendations to buy or sell a stock, option, future, bond, commodity or any other financial instrument at any time. Of course, he recommends that you consult with a qualified investment advisor, one licensed by appropriate regulatory agencies in your legal jurisdiction, before making any investment decisions, and barring that, we encourage you confirm the facts on your own before making important investment commitments.
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COPYRIGHT © Copyright 2010-2011 Gordon T Long. The information herein was obtained from sources which Mr. Long believes reliable, but he does not guarantee its accuracy. None of the information, advertisements, website links, or any opinions expressed constitutes a solicitation of the purchase or sale of any securities or commodities. Please note that Mr. Long may already have invested or may from time to time invest in securities that are recommended or otherwise covered on this website. Mr. Long does not intend to disclose the extent of any current holdings or future transactions with respect to any particular security. You should consider this possibility before investing in any security based upon statements and information contained in any report, post, comment or recommendation you receive from him.
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2014 THESIS: GLOBALIZATION TRAP
