The Eurozone needs to further ease monetary policy because under the current low inflation and high unemployment periphery countries need to suffer painful deflation. However, the ECB faces challenges other central banks do not face. This column proposes a way to overcome some of these hurdles. It argues that the ECB should buy US treasury securities, lowering the foreign exchange value of the euro. That would be the best way to restore the export sector of the periphery countries.
The ECB should further ease monetary policy. Inflation at 0.8% across the Eurozone is below the target of ‘close to 2%’, and unemployment in most countries is still high. Under the current conditions, it is hard for the periphery countries to bring their costs the rest of the way back down to internationally competitive levels as they need to do. If inflation is below 1% Eurozone-wide, then the periphery countries have to suffer painful deflation.
The question is how the ECB can ease, since short-term interest rates are already close to zero. Most of the talk in Europe is around proposals for the ECB to undertake Quantitative Easing (QE), following the path of the Fed and the Bank of Japan, expanding the money supply by buying the government bonds of member countries. This would be a realization of Mario Draghi’s idea of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), announced in August 2012, but which never had to be used (De Grauwe and Ji 2013).
QE would present a problem for the ECB that the Fed and other central banks do not face. The Eurozone has no centrally issued and traded Eurobond that the central bank could buy (and the time to create such a bond has not yet come, see Frankel 2012). That would mean that the ECB would have to buy bonds of member countries, which in turn means taking implicit positions on the creditworthiness of their individual finances. Germans tend to feel that ECB’s purchase of bonds issued by Greece and other periphery countries constitutes monetary financing of profligate governments and violates the laws under which the ECB was established. The German Constitutional Court believes that OMTs would exceed the ECBs mandate, though last month it temporarily handed the hot potato to the European Court of Justice. The legal obstacle is not merely an inconvenience but also represents a valid economic concern with the moral hazard that ECB bailouts present for members’ fiscal policies in the long term. That moral hazard was among the origins of the Greek crisis in the first place (Frankel 2011).
Fortunately, interest rates on the debt of Greece and other periphery countries have come down a lot over the last two years. Since he took the helm at the ECB, Mario Draghi has brilliantly walked the fine line required for ‘doing what it takes’ to keep the Eurozone together (After all, there would be little point in preserving pristine principles in the Eurozone if the result were that it broke up. And fiscal austerity was never going to put the periphery countries back on sustainable debt paths). At the moment, there is no need to support periphery bonds, especially if it would flirt with unconstitutionality.
Why should the ECB go back to the foreign exchange market?
What, then, should the ECB buy, if it is to expand the monetary base? It should not buy euro securities, but rather US treasury securities. In other words, it should go back to intervening in the foreign exchange market. Here are several reasons why.
First, it solves the problem of what to buy without raising legal obstacles. Operations in the foreign exchange market are well within the remit of the ECB.
Second, they also do not pose moral hazard issues (unless one thinks of the long-term moral hazard that the ‘exorbitant privilege’ of printing the world’s international currency creates for US fiscal policy).
Third, ECB purchases of dollars would help push the foreign exchange value of the euro down against the dollar.
Such foreign exchange operations among G7 central banks have fallen into disuse in recent years, in part because of the theory that they don’t affect exchange rates except when they change money supplies (Fratzscher 2004, Dominguez and Frankel 1993a, 1993b). There is some evidence that even sterilized intervention can be effective, including for the euro (Sarno and Taylor 2001, Reitz and Taylor 2008, Taylor 2004, Fatum and Hutchinson 2002). But in any case, we are talking about an ECB purchase of dollars that would change the euro money supply. The increased supply of euros would lower their foreign exchange value.
Monetary expansion that depreciates the currency is effective. It is more effective than monetary expansion that does not, especially when, as at present, there is very little scope for pushing short-term interest rates much lower.
Depreciation of the euro would be the best medicine for restoring international price competitiveness to the periphery countries and bringing their export sectors back to health. Of course, they would devalue on their own if they had not given up their currencies for the euro ten years before the crisis (and if it were not for their euro-denominated debt). Euro depreciation is the answer.
The strength of the euro has held up remarkably during the four years of crisis. Indeed, the currency appreciated further when the ECB declined to undertake any monetary stimulus at its March 6 meeting. The euro could afford to weaken substantially. Even Germans might warm up to easy money if it meant more exports rather than less.
Concluding remarks
Central banks should – and do – choose their monetary policies primarily to serve the interests of their own economies. The interests of those who live in other parts of the world come second. But proposals to coordinate policies internationally for mutual benefit are fair. Raghuram Rajan, head of the Reserve Bank of India, has recently called for the central banks in industrialized countries to take the interests of emerging markets into account by coordinating internationally.
How would ECB foreign exchange intervention fare by the lights of G20 cooperation? Very well. This year the emerging markets are worried about tightening of global monetary policy. The fears are no longer monetary loosening as in the ‘currency wars’ talk of three years ago. As the Fed tapers back on its purchases of US treasury securities, it is a perfect time for the ECB to step in, and buy some itself.
03-26-14
EU MONETARY
4- EU Banking Crisis
ECB - EU Version of QE Coming -> UST Purchases To Drive Euro Down
Last week we reported that while the West was busy alienating Russia in every diplomatic way possible, without of course exposing its crushing overreliance on Russian energy exports to keep European industries alive, Russia was just as busy cementing its ties with China, in this case courtesy of Europe's most important company, Gazprom, which is preparing to announce the completion of a "holy grail" natural gas supply deal to Beijing. We also noted the following: "And as if pushing Russia into the warm embrace of the world's most populous nation was not enough, there is also the second most populated country in the world, India." Today we learn just how prescient this particular comment also was, when Reuters reported that Rosneft, theworld's top listed oil producer by output, may join forces with Indian state-run Oil and Natural Gas Corp to supply oil to India over the long term, the Russian state-controlled company said on Tuesday.
Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin, an ally of President Vladimir Putin, travelled to India on Sunday, part of a wider Asian trip to shore up ties with eastern allies at a time when Moscow is being shunned by the West over its annexation of Crimea.
With EU nations threatening to cut their reliance on Russian oil and gas, Russian officials have started to look East.
Rosneft said it had also agreed with ONGC they may join forces in Rosneft's yet-to-be built liquefied natural gas plant in the far east of Russia to the benefit of Indian consumers.
We just have one question: will payment for crude and LNG be made in Rubles or Rupees? Or in gold. Because it certainly won't be in dollars.
Rosneft, which is increasing oil flows to Asia to diversify away from Europe, did not provide any additional details but said it had discussed potential cooperation with Reliance Industries and Indian Oil.
It did not have to: it is quite clear what is going on. While the US is bumbling every possible foreign policy move in Ukraine (and how could it not with John Kerry at the helm), and certainly in the middle east, where it is alienating Israel and Saudi just to get closer to Iran, Russia is aggressively cementing the next, biggest (certainly in terms of population and natural resources), and most important New Normal geopolitical Eurasian axis: China - Russia - India.
More:
The company said Sechin and the head of Indian conglomerate Reliance Industries also met and discussed potential cooperation in developing Russia's offshore resources, viewed by Moscow as a source of future oil production growth.
India was the last country in Sechin's Asian trip, where he also visited Japan, South Korea and Vietnam.
Russia is the world's top oil producer, pumping over 10 million barrels per day but mostly from west Siberian deposits, which are running out. Moscow is betting on offshore and unconventional oil to maintain the level.
At the same time, Russia is trying to diversify its energy flows away from its core European markets, with Rosneft leading the race with plans to triple oil flows to China to over 1 million barrels per day in coming years.
Rosneft said Sechin also discussed potential shipments of Russia's East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil blend to India's biggest refiner Indian Oil Corporation (IOC.NS) but did not provide details.
There is only one country missing - Germany. Because while diplomatically Germany is ideologically as close to the US as can be, its economy is far more reliant on China and Russia, something the two nations realize all too well. The second the German industrialists make it clear they are shifting their allegiance to the Eurasian Axis and away from the Group of 6 (ex Germany) most insolvent countries in the world, that will be the moment the days of the current reserve petrocurrency will be numbered.
03-26-14
GLOBAL PETRODOLLAR
25 - Oil Price Pressures
RISK -Risk Being Withdrawn
03-26-14
RISK
PATTERNS - Russell Medium PE on 5 Yr Normalized EPS
Since the early twentieth century, Saudi Arabia has enjoyed a close relationship with the United States. From the development of the Saudi oil fields,to the First Gulf War, this relationship has been an uneasy cooperation—each side received something out of the alliance while nervously watching the other. So recently we have the first open break between the two powers culminating in the Saudi’s refusing a seat on the U.N Security Council due to anger with U.S. Middle Eastern policies.
Saudi Arabia holds the world’s second largest oil reserves and the sixth largest natural gas fields. In addition to being located in the most volatile part of the world, these energy assets make the country a strategic interest for any global power.
The discovery of vast hydrocarbon reserves in the United States and the ability to harvest them through hydraulic fracturing techniques has radically altered the relationship between the two countries. Ironically, even though the Obama administration has reduced drilling on Federal lands in the US and attempted to curtail hydrocarbon use overall, it is fracking which has allowed the United States to nearly gain energy independence, become a net energy exporter again, and reduced the need to buy oil from the Middle East. This shift in the balance of power with the Saudis has made the Kingdom extremely nervous.
American policy adds to the Saudi’s concerns. The Saudi oil fields, located in the eastern part of the country, are the home to the country’s Shia minority. As the guardians of the holy Muslim sites, the royal family walks a fine line between satisfying the Sunni Ulema, fighting terrorism, and keeping the Shia population in check. Hence, their concern with America’s recent overtures to Iran.
The Obama administration has been Hell bent to secure a deal with the Shia Islamist state regarding its development of nuclear weapons. Now that the deal is in place, the Iranians are openly taunting the West with shouts of victory rather than assuring the world they have no intent to join the nuclear club. John Kerry and his Dept of State have been either naive, weak, or both when it comes to negotiating with the mullahs. The Saudis, along with the Israelis and other Gulf states, cannot tolerate a nuclear armed Iran. There are rumors that Saudi Arabia has paid Pakistan for the development of its own nuclear deterrent and is one month away from operational capability if they saw fit.
In addition, the Kingdom is furious with U.S. refusal to arm Sunni rebels fighting the Iranian backed Syrian regime. The uneasy trust between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia has been broken. This opens up the playing field for other global powers such a China or Russia to make inroads where the U.S. once enjoyed hegemony. It also opens up the world to a possible nuclear arms race in the Middle East. In fact, this is already happening in Egypt, another broken U.S. relationship, who just closed a major arms deal with Russia in a slap in the face to the Obama Administration’s decision to cut military aid. China would like nothing better than to gain access to a secure source of Saudi oil and strategic American built bases as well.
There have been calls from many quarters for the U.S. to mend fences with Iran in order to prevent a conflict and counter the Sunni influence in the region. It seems obvious that for this to happen, Iran needs to show real progress in addressing the world’s fear that they intend on acquiring the bomb and have plans to use this threat to destroy Israel and/or the interests of the United States. But alas, this will probably not happen with the current Iranian government.
It is foolish for America to offend and promote distrust with another ally in a long list of broken long-standing relationships. These include Poland, United Kingdom, Israel, Egypt, etc. One wonders whether the results of American diplomacy stems from extreme incompetence or is evidence of a much darker agenda
03-24-14
GLOBAL
GEO-POL
PETRO$$
8 - Geo-Political Event
GLOBAL PETRODOLLAR - EU Energy Dependency Stands Out
03-24-14
GLOBAL
GEO-POL
PETRO$$
8 - Geo-Political Event
RESERVE CURRENCY - Yuan as A Third 'Balancing" Reserve Currency
Speaking at the Chinese Economic Development Forum, ITAR-TASS reports, the Chief Economist of Russia's largest bank stated that "China's Yuan may become the third reserve currency in the in the future."
Managing Director and Chief Economist of investment company Sberbank Yevgeny Gavrilenkov said at the 15th governmental Chinese economic development forum in the Chinese capital on Sunday (via ITAR-TASS):
"China’s yuan (renminbi) may become a third reserve currency in the world in the future"
"This forecast can be made on figures of domestic economic growth. Probably the country will keep high GDP growth rate and the GDP volume will increase to around 14-16 trillion U.S. dollars for a brief period of time, the indicators comparable to the European Union and the United States.
Meanwhile, Chinese securities are more attractive for the countries that have a surplus in economy, particularly the Middle East states; and China will obviously follow the path of securing the country’s assets,"
The forum which opened in the Chinese capital on March 22 discusses a broad range of issues of economic reforms and China’s stronger role as the second largest world economy. First Deputy Prime Minister of the Chinese State Council Zhang Gaoli, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund Christine Lagarde and top managers of major world corporations participate in the forum as honorary guests.
With respect to the crisis in Ukraine, the Obama administration has struggled to respond on the fly and calibrate a strategy that sends a clear message to Russia while keeping in mind the necessity to keep Putin as a diplomatic partner.
This is where Putin's greatest leverage lies in Ukraine. The U.S. needs him as a partner to complete major objectives with regard to Iran nuclear talks, the Syrian war, and negotiations between Israel and Palestine.
"Everyone wants to avoid confrontation with Putin, pretend he’s an ally or at least that he can be worked with," Garry Kasparov — a former grand chess master and loud critic of Putin and the Obama administration's strategy toward Russia — told Business Insider. "This has always been a myth, and now everyone is finally realizing what a dangerous myth it was."
The crises are blending some of the thorniest issues of President Obama's second term. On Wednesday, Russia Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov warned the U.S. of the consequences of further sanctions, saying it could recalibrate its position on Iran.
Senior Obama administration officials signaled Thursday they believe Russia is bluffing over its Iran threat. But it was also clear from a conference call with these officials that there's no contingency plan if Russia is serious.
"We will evaluate Russian actions. We take note of their words, but we have not seen a change in the P5-plus-1," one senior U.S. official said, referring to the group of the six world powers. "Now, that may not stay the same. They may act on the words of the deputy foreign minister yesterday. But all we can say is what we’ve seen to date, which is the P5-plus-1 is continuing a regular rhythm of political directors meetings and technical expert meetings."
The official didn't answer follow-up questions asking for a direct response to Ryabkov's comments, which cannot be taken lightly. Already in January, Iran and Russia moved toward a significant deal that would allow Iran to lift oil exports in defiance of Western sanctions.
“If you’re Putin and you think you’re going to be a target of sanctions, the most obvious leverage is in the Iranian file, where Russian cooperation is so important,” Mark Dubowitz, the executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told The New York Times.
A Russian shift in position on Iran, after months of cooperation, would dramatically deteriorate the possibility of a diplomatic end to the issue.
We've seen this play out before. Putin called the shots last September, when Obama said he had made the decision to surgically strike targets in Syria in response to the gassing of more than 1,000 civilians in the suburbs of Damascus.
Moscow provided an alternative, jumping on an offhanded comment by John Kerry. The subsequent process of removing Syria's chemical weapons has been full of missed and extended deadlines, while Syrian President Bashar Assad's forces continue to bomb Syrian civilians into oblivion with Russian weapons.
Why did the U.S. abandon its original plan to strike Assad? Much of it had to do with the fact that it needed Russia as a crucial partner in Iran nuclear talks.
Now, Moscow-Washington relations are crumbling, while Assad takes advantage of the Ukraine crisis to crush the rebellion to his rule. And Putin's continued support of ousted President Viktor Yanukovych has reinforced to Assad that Putin will protect his interests in Syria.
Basically, the "Russian reset" policy of engaging the Kremlin to pursue shared goals "has been a serious foreign policy failure for the Obama administration," Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group, told Business Insider.
It's not clear whether Russia will carry out its threat on Iran — after all, it also has interest in a comprehensive deal. It doesn't want a war in its backyard and, as one U.S. official said, if Iran develops a nuclear weapon it would be "whole lot closer to Russia" than the U.S.
But in the weeks to come, the U.S. will clearly be walking on a fine line as several of the world's most pressing geopolitical problems become increasingly intertwined.
"On Ukraine, again, I am confident that we will all approach this negotiation to get our work done and our job done," one official coming out of the latest Iran talks told reporters Tuesday.
"And I continue to hope that ongoing events in Ukraine and actions that may be taken will not change that. But I can't tell you today for a certainty that that will be the case, because all of the events happening in the world are not under our control."
Russia is making several changes to its energy strategy and technical capabilities as it tries to keep up with developments in global energy. Russia holds the world's second-largest proven conventional natural gas reserves and alternates with Saudi Arabia as the world's top oil producer. But recently, Russia's ability to wield energy as a potent political weapon has started to wane. Now, Moscow is moving to embrace liquefied natural gas, offshore drilling and hydraulic fracturing technology to ensure the energy sector's future.
Analysis
Russia supplies just under one-third of Europe's oil and natural gas, and energy revenue makes up approximately 50 percent of the Russian government's budget. Consequently, the energy sector is the primary pillar of not only Russia's current stability but also its foreign policy toward the West.
However, recent years have produced ominous signs for the future of Russia's energy industry. Russia's primary oil-producing region -- the Western Oil Basin -- is in decline, and new fields in other regions such as the Yamal Peninsula and East Siberia will likely have much higher production costs and will require new infrastructure to transport the energy to consumers. New producers that also are coming online, such as Azerbaijan and Algeria, can supply the European market, primarily via liquefied natural gas, which is transported by ship instead of pipeline.
To counteract these trends, Russia is changing how it operates internally and in the global energy markets. For example, Russia has already adjusted its approach to energy contracts with Europe, with Moscow giving price discounts to key customers such as Germany in exchange for longer-term deals. Russia has also tried to expand its customer base away from just Europe, supplementing its exports there with exports to East Asia. Oil exports to East Asia already constitute 17 percent of all exports, up from 4 percent in 2006, and Russia plans to follow with natural gas exports to Asia.
Embracing New Technologies
Russia also has other initiatives in the works. On Sept. 25, Russian Deputy Energy Minister Kirill Molodtsov said the Russian government would aim for the country's natural gas exports to account for 20 percent of the world's liquefied natural gas by 2030. Currently, Russia has only one liquefied natural gas facility at Sakhalin-2, but there are plans for half a dozen more new liquefied natural gas facilities across Russia's coasts. Russia has taken note of the many import facilities being built across Europe and East Asia, and it wants to keep up with the shift away from traditionally piped natural gas to seaborne imports. This would be a major change for the country, but it would enable Russia to continue its drive to diversify its customer base, since liquefied natural gas exports are able to go anywhere that has a liquefied natural gas import terminal.
Another recent development for the Russian energy sector has been technical advancements made by the country's energy giant Gazprom. Like most Russian energy firms, Gazprom has a reputation for being a rather outdated company in terms of its technical capabilities. This is why Russian energy firms have repeatedly tried to bring in foreign energy majors for their expertise on the more difficult or newer projects -- which the Kremlin loathes since it does not want to rely on foreign assistance (particularly from Western firms) in its most strategically important sector. However, it now appears Russia has been able to develop some important capabilities domestically.
Gazprom announced Sept. 17 that its oil subsidiary, GazpromNeft, became the first Russian company to drill a horizontal well as part of a hydraulic fracturing operation. Even though Russia has had components of hydraulic fracturing technology for decades, it is now using the technologies in a coordinated manner -- though it should be noted that Russia is still far behind other countries; the United States, for example, is already consistently fracturing wells five times deeper than the Russian wells.
In the past, Russia has opposed hydraulic fracturing. It reportedly even funded many of the anti-hydraulic fracturing movements around the world. Moscow's opposition to hydraulic fracturing stems from a fear that if more countries can tap unconventional sources for oil and natural gas, the need for Russian oil or natural gas could start to decline. However, the global trend of countries and energy firms becoming more interested in turning to hydraulic fracturing has forced Russia to adopt the trend as well.
Moreover, many of Russia's oil fields are in rapid decline, particularly in the Western Oil Basin, which has been producing two-thirds of Russia's overall oil production for decades. If Russia can shift oil production within the Western Oil Basin to take advantage of the tight oil reserves -- the type that requires hydraulic fracturing -- it could slow or perhaps halt the production declines, since Russia is estimated to have more recoverable tight oil reserves than any other country. Moscow also had the choice of focusing on developing the more difficult and costly reserves in the country -- such as East Siberia or the Yamal Peninsula -- but instead opted to embrace new technologies in order to continue using its current infrastructure for oil transport.
Another major development involves Gazprom's Sakhalin-3 natural gas project. Sakhalin-3, which will start commercial operation in October, will be the first subsea production by a Russian firm. Russia's Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 each have relied major foreign energy firms (ExxonMobil and Royal Dutch/Shell, respectively) to provide the technical expertise for subsea production. Gazprom has been attempting the Sakhalin-3 project on its own, and limited production is already underway. Commercial production may begin in October. Sakhalin-3 is not expected to produce a large amount of natural gas, but the fact that Gazprom has been able successfully undertake such a technically difficult project on its own is a milestone for the natural gas giant.
Though Gazprom has had components of each of these technologies before, it is now able to use several production methods in tandem. It is unclear how Gazprom acquired the expertise to do this, but rumors have persisted that the energy firm has been secretly hiring engineers and technicians out of the Western energy majors over the past few years. This is traditionally how Russia makes drastic technological advances, rather than developing the expertise domestically. The Russian Empire snatched oil production technology from the U.S. and European oil firms operating in the Caucasus and Volga regions. The Soviet Union stole the technology on how to make its atomic bomb from the German and American nuclear programs. The Soviets attempted to steal the blueprints from the French to make their version of the Concorde supersonic aircraft, the Tupolev Tu-144.
This strategy of pilfering new technology has worked repeatedly for the Russians in the past, particularly when Moscow has found itself behind and has needed to keep up with a rapidly changing world. With the energy sector so critical to Russia's stability and ability to project its influence abroad, Moscow will need to take advantage of all its available options, including embracing new technologies, to ensure the sector's continued health
Oil deals have thus far dominated Russia and China's energy relationship, but now its focus is shifting toward the more complicated sector of natural gas. Russia wants to diversify its energy exports away from Europe -- a feat it has already accomplished with oil. Meanwhile, China's demand for natural gas is growing, and Beijing is looking to increase imports from multiple suppliers and via multiple routes.
Analysis
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin traveled to China and struck a series of deals on behalf of Russian oil giant Rosneft, of which he is a board member. In June, the two sides agreed to a $270 billion oil deal under which Russia, starting in 2015, will export 300,000 barrels per day to China for 25 years, on top of the 400,000 barrels per day it already delivers noncontractually. In addition to this deal, Sechin and Rosneft agreed with China National Petroleum Corp. to construct a new oil refinery in the Chinese city of Tianjin and launch a joint venture to open gas stations across China that would be fed by Russian oil -- Moscow's first venture into China's gasoline market.
While oil deals between Russia and China have been fairly easy to make, Beijing has recently begun to shift its focus toward natural gas. China's natural gas consumption has grown steadily over the past decade, and Beijing has been considering multiple sources and routes through which to import the resource. In 2012, China imported approximately 42.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas -- nearly 30 percent of the country's total annual consumption of 143.8 billion cubic meters. Beijing has forecast that its natural gas consumption will continue to grow rapidly, estimating that it will reach between 200 billion and 250 billion cubic meters by 2020. This is conservative compared to the International Energy Agency's predictions of a growth to more than 300 billion cubic meters a year by 2020, which, if true, would mean that China's natural gas consumption would nearly triple within a decade.
China is looking to expand its domestic natural gas production quickly, with a heavy emphasis on tight gas production (50 billion cubic meters by 2015) and shale gas production (60 billion to 100 billion cubic meters by 2020). However, Beijing is not likely to meet its shale gas production goal, and is counting on imports to make up the difference. Currently, about half of China's natural gas imports are liquefied natural gas -- mostly from Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Qatar and others. In 2012, China imported 20 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas; the only piped natural gas imports were from Turkmenistan and totaled approximately 21.3 billion cubic meters.
For Asian customers, liquefied natural gas is currently far more expensive than piped natural gas, with a price difference of more than $200 per thousand cubic meters. However, China expects liquefied natural gas imports to become cheaper in the long term and is either building or planning to build additional liquefied natural gas import facilities. The Asian natural gas market historically has been defined by long-term contracts -- often covering a period of 20 years or so -- in which the price of natural gas sold is indexed to the global price of crude oil. This, however, is changing, as new sources of liquefied natural gas in North America, East Africa and possibly other regions continue to emerge over the next decade.
As a result, natural gas prices are shifting toward gas-on-gas pricing mechanisms, and more contracts will be based on these mechanisms. For instance, in June, Korean Gas Corp. signed a 20-year contract with the United States' Cheniere Energy, Inc., setting the price at a 15 percent premium to the benchmark natural gas price in the United States, plus an additional $106 per thousand cubic meters. This shift will take the next two decades to play out, but China is thinking about the long term.
In the shorter term, Beijing is primarily looking at piped natural gas because of its lower price and greater security. China has deeply rooted concerns about limiting its energy imports to supplies that are transported over sea, particularly since competitions over resources and security in East Asian waters have intensified in recent years. In order to ensure that it has a more secure avenue for natural gas imports than these restive sea lanes, Beijing has turned its gaze westward to overland transportation routes.
As China diversifies its options for natural gas suppliers, it is leveraging its position to get the best deals it can out of new contracts with Russia. Because Russia is counting on the Chinese natural gas market to help it move away from exporting energy to Europe, Moscow is offering concessions to Beijing, particularly in light of the growing competition it faces.
Analysis
China has already struck natural gas deals with Turkmenistan. Under the current agreement between Turkmengaz and China National Petroleum Corp., China was to import 30 billion cubic meters per year from Turkmenistan starting in 2010. However, Ashgabat has only been able to send Beijing 21.4 billion cubic meters per year as of 2012, though this level is expected to reach 30 billion cubic meters in late 2013 or early 2014. Natural gas exports from Turkmenistan to China would increase starting in 2015 to 40 billion cubic meters, with the option of reaching 65 billion cubic meters per year by 2020, though the contract allows for flexibility between 30 billion and 65 billion cubic meters. Currently, the Central Asia-China natural gas pipeline has a capacity of 40 billion cubic meters, but expansions are planned in the next few years. On the Chinese side of the border, the West-East Gas Pipeline II has a capacity of 30 billion cubic meters, and a third leg of the pipeline to be completed by 2015 will double that capacity.
Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Turkmenistan on Sept. 4 in order to inaugurate the massive Galkynysh natural gas field, which began production in July. The field is one of the largest in the world, holding between 13.1 trillion and 21.2 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves, and will feed primarily into the pipeline to China. The Chinese government has already given $8 billion to finance the Galkynysh project and promised even more financing during Xi's recent visit, though the specific amount has not been announced yet.
The Russian Option and Complications
Beijing isn't just counting on Turkmenistan to fill its increasing natural gas needs. China has also turned to Russia for natural gas supplies, but this relationship has been difficult for both sides. Though oil deals historically have been easy for Russia and China to strike, the countries have been struggling to make a major natural gas deal for more than a decade.
First, Russian oil is exported by multiple producers, which has allowed China to negotiate more desirable prices for supplies. Gazprom currently monopolizes Russian natural gas exports, which gives consumers little leverage to bargain for lower prices. Second, while Moscow primarily uses oil to make money, natural gas is more useful as a political tool for the Kremlin; financial gain is its secondary use. Because of this, China has been wary of striking a natural gas deal that would make it politically vulnerable to Russia, as Europe has been in the past. China is extending natural gas negotiations in order to have a more advantageous market and more leverage in dealing with the Russians, and this tactic seems to be working so far.
With changes taking place in the natural gas industry, both in the region and in Russia itself, a deal between Russia and China could be more plausible. Now that Turkmenistan's Galkynysh field is operational, Beijing can force Russia to compete with Turkmenistan for the Chinese market. This has already been seen in the recent negotiations between Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corp.
The companies struck a preliminary deal for natural gas exports to China on Sept. 5, but a series of obstacles could keep it from materializing. Under the latest agreement, Russia will export 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year to China starting in 2017 and another 30 billion cubic meters per year by 2020 -- all under a 20-year contract. The natural gas will be exported through the planned Power of Siberia natural gas pipeline, which will stretch 4,000 kilometers (2,485 miles) from the Yamal Peninsula to the Pacific Ocean with four pipeline spurs to China. The pipeline will also pass by two new natural gas fields under development in East Siberia: Chayandin and Kovykta. These fields are expected to begin production of 25 billion cubic meters each in 2015 and 2017, respectively.
However, with Turkmenistan's new natural gas field now able to export to China, and with the possibility of lower liquefied natural gas prices on the horizon, it seems that Beijing is not in a hurry to strike the final deal with Gazprom over the price of natural gas. In negotiations over the past decade, Gazprom has asked China to pay European-level prices for natural gas, proposing at least $400 per thousand cubic meters. In the past year, Russia has dropped its price to $300 per thousand cubic meters in order to make the price much more attractive in comparison to what China currently pays for liquefied natural gas imports and for imports from Turkmenistan.
Currently, spot-market prices for liquefied natural gas in Asia are approximately $635 per thousand cubic meters, though heavy discounts are given if the liquefied natural gas exports are contracted. Turkmenistan charges China $333 per thousand cubic meters (indexed on oil prices), but including the 13 percent value added tax, tariffs for transit through Kazakhstan and a tariff for the use of China's West-East Gas Pipeline, the price ends up being $494 per thousand cubic meters.
Both prices are well above the figure Gazprom is currently proposing to China. However, Gazprom has not clarified what tariffs and taxes will be tacked on to the price of $300 per thousand cubic meters. Gazprom (along with other Russian energy firms) is currently lobbying the Kremlin to cancel any export tariffs for natural gas going to Asia. This would keep Gazprom's proposed price significantly lower than those of its competitors, even when liquefied natural gas prices begin falling. China appears to be waiting on the Kremlin's decision on the issue before signing the final agreement with Gazprom.
Beijing's wariness of a natural gas contract with Russia and its concern about the end price of Russian natural gas has put Gazprom in a difficult position. The company was supposed to begin constructing the Power of Siberia pipeline in September, but without a final deal with China in place, it is postponing construction of the $32 billion pipeline until early 2014 to ensure that there will be a market for the natural gas the line will carry. Gazprom is courting other customers, such as South Korea and Japan, to sign contracts for natural gas exports via the pipeline, but the volume these countries would import is not nearly as great as the amount China has proposed.
Later in September, the Russian Duma is expected to consider revoking Gazprom's monopoly on liquefied natural gas exports -- a big step toward weakening Gazprom's hold on the natural gas sector. Although this would not affect Gazprom's hold on piped natural gas, it would make Russian natural gas more commercially friendly, and is meant to sweeten Russia's energy deals with all consumers, not just China. With this shift on the horizon in Moscow, China National Petroleum Corp. signed an agreement Sept. 5 with independent Russian natural gas firm Novatek for a 20 percent stake in its planned liquefied natural gas facility on the Yamal Peninsula, which could give the Chinese firm the option of first exports headed to Asia. China National Petroleum Corp. is also in talks with Rosneft to possibly launch a joint liquefied natural gas facility at Vladivostok.
China's Grand Position
Beijing has been able to diversify its sources of natural gas and its import methods. China has nearly a dozen liquefied natural gas facilities either under construction or in the planning stages, has already secured a high volume of natural gas from Turkmenistan over the long term, and is in the process of making a similar deal with Russia. In addition, China is focusing on domestic natural gas production. All of this allows Beijing to design deals with foreign partners to its advantage, leveraging one player against another.
Should China's natural gas consumption continue to grow at its current rate, each of these methods of natural gas production and imports will be needed to fill its demand. However, there is the critical question of whether China's natural gas needs will indeed continue growing as the country's economy slows down -- from growth of more than 10 percent each year for a decade to less than 8 percent this year. China has crafted its natural gas contracts with Russia and Turkmenistan in a way that allows it to receive a wide range of natural gas volumes from each country, should China need to decrease its imports. China can also resell liquefied natural gas imports to other consumers.
While this is wise for Beijing, it puts Moscow and Ashgabat in a tenuous position. The future growth of Turkmenistan's economy depends on natural gas exports to China; energy sales currently comprise 60 percent of the Turkmen gross national product. Russia has made natural gas exports to China and elsewhere in Asia part of its grand diversification project to relieve its dependence on Europe as an energy market. Should China's demand for natural gas not grow as aggressively as forecast, or should its domestic production meet the volume China is aiming for, then Beijing's need for both Turkmen and Russian natural gas might not be as high as expected. This could intensify the competition between Russia and Turkmenistan over the Chinese market -- a development Beijing could continue using to its advantage.
03-25-14
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